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3Abstract: We use a two-country dynamic model in a monetary union in which we introduce a wealth
private behaviour. We study the implications of public debt on monetary and fiscal policies in the short
and the long run. We analyse the effects of asymmetric fiscal policies in Euroland: the first country has
fiscal room for manoeuvre whereas the second country is fettered by the Stability Pact. We show that
such a situation creates two feedback effects which reduce the efficiency of economic policies. First,
because of the inability of one government to implement an expansionist fiscal policy, the other
government has to substitute for it in order to stabilise inflation and production. Second, the ECB’s
involvement in macroeconomic stabilisation will also be exacerbated. The more substantial these effects,
the more co-operation is needed between European governments and the ECB.
Résumé : Nous nous inscrivons dans le cadre d’un modèle dynamique à deux pays formant une union
monétaire, avec introduction de comportements patrimoniaux de la part des agents privés. Nous étudions
ainsi spécifiquement les implications de l’accumulation de la dette publique sur les politiques monétaire
et budgétaires à court et à long terme. Nous analysons les effets du caractère dissymétrique de la
politique budgétaire dans la zone euro, c’est-à-dire le fait qu’un pays puisse bénéficier de marges de
manœuvre tandis que l’autre est contraint par les dispositions du Pacte de stabilité. On montre alors que
cette situation provoque deux types d’externalité qui réduisent le degré d’efficacité des politiques
économiques. D’une part, l’incapacité d’un pays à mener une politique budgétaire oblige les autres
 ; d’autre part, la BCE devra s’impliquer davantage dans
une politique de stabilisation de l’inflation et de la production à son potentiel. Une coordination entre les
gouvernements et la BCE est d’autant plus souhaitable que ces externalités sont importantes.
JEL Classification: E17, E63, H63
Keywords: monetary and fiscal policies, EMU, Stability Pact, fiscal theory of inflation, public debt.
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5THE STABILITY PACT AND FEEDBACK POLICY EFFECTS
Jérôme Creel
The treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam did not either resolve the old problem
regarding economic policies’ co-operation in the EU, nor organise fiscal federalism. If
co-operation has been tackled, it has been in a quite questionable way. First, the so-
called co-operation is asymmetric: in order to prevent any drift in public finances, any
temptation or risk to monetise public debts, any loss of credibility by the independent
Central bank1, fiscal policy has been compelled during the convergence stage to stick to
the absolute norm of a public deficit inferior to 3% of GDP. The Stability (and Growth)
Pact has moreover reinforced the convergence process for public finances in the EU: it
will limit public deficits after the arrival of the euro. Second, the Council (Euro 11) is
not a European government. The future should eventually demonstrate its efficiency.
Two macroeconomic implications of the Pact are already clear. On the one hand, it
will be more difficult or maybe impossible for European governments to provide an
optimal regulation for economic fluctuations. In the present situation, though the
Maastricht’s norm on public debt has been wiped out as regards the entry of some
countries in the Euroland, we nonetheless think that the public finances in these countries
(Belgium, Italy) will be carefully supervised by the Commission or the European Central
Bank (ECB). Any deviation in the way to fiscal contraction will be penalised by financial
markets operators (according to the discrimination principle developed by Buit r &
Kletzer, 1991), households (Ricardian equivalence along Barro’s, 1974, or Giavazzi &
Pagano’s, 1990, analyses), the Commission or the ECB (in order to preserve its
credibility). In this sense, fiscal policies in these countries will be pro-cyclical.
On the other hand, the ECB will strategically dominate governments in the short
run: it will set its policy in line with its goal of price stability and if fiscal policies are
judged too expansionist, it will further increase the nominal European interest rate.
Governments will have to choose between reducing their spending, i.e. a domination by
the ECB; increasing them to compensate the restrictive impact of monetary policy (see
Capoen et al., 1994); last, trying to co-operate with the ECB. Based on the
circumstances during the convergence stage, governments might well choose the first
solution.
Two other consequences of the Pact have been neglected so far, as far as we know.
First, the inability of a government to implement a fiscal policy after a shock has
occurred may impinge largely on its EU partners: these governments should be
compelled to use their own fiscal expenditures to offset the shock. This situation
resembles that of the free rider. If expansionist fiscal policies can produce favourable
effects which spill over among EU’s countries, they also have costs to the country which
has increased the deficit: implementation costs, sunk costs, financial costs through the
interest charges which impede the future capacities of governments to implement fiscal
policies.
                                         
1 Cf. Eichengreen & Wyplosz (1998).
6Second, the ECB will also suffer from the constraints of the Pact. It will have to
substitute for the absence of fiscal policy in a country under the rule of the Pact. In the
long run, if we oppose to the Barro-Ricardian equivalence between tax and public
borrowing a theory of wealth effects linked to public debt holding by households, along
the lines of Patinkin’s (1965), the ECB will have to adjust households’ private wealth
projects to actual public debt and net foreign assets levels: if, for example, public debt
increases in relation to GDP after a negative private demand shock, the ECB will have to
choose between reducing the interest rate to curb debt’s accumulation or increasing it to
make private wealth grow faster. Depending on its reaction in the long run, the ECB will
be more or less fettered in its policy choices and its ability to smooth economic
fluctuations2.
As an illustration of these two feedback effects, we use a two-country model in the
EMU with dynamic behaviours. We assume that one of the two countries has no fiscal
room for manoeuvre because it has already reached the deficit ceiling of the Stability
Pact. Its government must strictly meet its budget constraint. We further assume that the
other government and the ECB implement economic policies which are consistent with
the minimisation of their own loss functions. Policies are not exogenous; rather, they
respond to a private demand shock.
This policy framework differs from that found usually in two-country models dealing
with the EMU: it is necessary, as far as the stability of wealth accumulation is concerned,
that public debt over GDP be stable in the long run, but not in the short run. Hence,
fiscal policies in our framework may well reveal macroeconomic stabilisation properties
which are absent from other models (see Jensen and Jensen, 1995, for example).
The shock in the economy (or economies) is supposed to be permanent. We study
Nash equilibria between the three autonomous policymakers and then compare them to
co-operative equilibria which we compute according to the Nash-bargaining procedure3.
The theoretical model
Despite the Stability Pact, it is not at all sure that countries in the Euroland will be
fettered by its provisions after a supply or demand shock. This will be all the more true if
they have already recovered fiscal room for manoeuvre. However, some countries will
surely have to spare any additional increase in their public debt over GDP ratio in the
following years. These countries will have to pursue balanced fiscal policies in the best
case, or to keep on reducing their deficits, in the worst.
Aggregate demand and wealth effect
Our model is dynamic and can be characterised by the wealth behaviour of private
agents in the economy4. It has Keynesian features in the short run (output is driven by
                                         
2 Note that in the multi-country Multimod model (see Masson et al., 1990, for more details), there
is no distinction between effective and desired wealth in the short run. Nothing therefore explains why
households want to hold net foreign and public assets. Furthermore, it is not easy to understand how
assets accumulation gets to an end. We compare our consumption function to that used by Masson e  al.
in appendix 2.
3 Computations are described in appendix 4.
7the level of demand, prices adjust slowly to their steady state levels) but Wicksellian
features in the long run: output is determined according to the real equilibrium interest
rate, which depends on the effects of monetary and fiscal policies on the inflation rate5.
Aggregate demand is similar to that used in Mundell-Fleming models, except that we
introduce a wealth effect. Aggregate supply follows a Phillips curve.
We study a polar case in the EMU: two countries, identical as far as private
behaviours are concerned, form a monetary union6. Ho seholds in both countries hold
wealth which is the sum of public debt and net foreign assets. We assume that private
agents form wealth plans which positively depend on the real interest rate (r) and
disposable income (( )1- t y)7. This wealth effect is introduced according to the
following channels. In the short run, an increase in the real interest rate has two opposite
effects on consumption in theory: substitution and wealth effects. We suppose that the
former dominates the latter: private savings increases, i.e. the part of disposable income
which is devoted to the accumulation of wealth w y/[( ) ]1- t  increases, and
consumption decreases. Aggregate demand thus has to satisfy:
¶ ¶r mb ty w y/ ( )= - - <1 0.
In the long run, wealth increases with the real interest rate and consumption is
higher (see equation 1). If actual wealth (w) differs from desired (or planned) wealth,
private agents help it to reach its desired level8 at spe d m. This wealth effect thus
resembles the Pigouvian or real balance effect: if actual wealth is beneath its desired
level, because of an increase in the real interest rate, private consumption will be reduced
until savings has reached the desired equilibrium level. In the long run, households will
use this savings in order to boost their own consumption.
In short, aggregate demand (equation 1) depends on the gap between actual and
planned wealth, but also on disposable income, interests on wealth (rw)9, trade balance
(bc), public expenditures (g) and a private demand shock (x). Aggregate supply
(equation 3) is derived according to a Phillips curve with a cost effect due to the real
interest rate. p represents the inflation rate, z a supply shock. We assume that there is a
delay in the adjustment of prices because of staggered contracts in the economy. Wealth
(equation 4) is the sum of public debt and net foreign assets which grow after a trade
deficit. Equations 5 and 6 describe the growth of these two assets. The model is
supposed to be quarterly. Shocks occur in the first quarter of 1999 and are permanent.
(1) y y w bc g w y x= - + + + + - + - +( ) [ ( )( ) ]1 1t r m a br t
(2) bc y y= - + -h hd p p( * ) ( * )
                                                                                                          
4 For a first approach in the EMU, see Creel, Lerais & Sterdyniak (1995). See also notes 2 and 8.
5 For more details on the fiscal theory of inflation, see Wo dford (1998).
6 Equations in country 2 are obtained by circular permutation; this country’s variables are starred.
7 The consumption function is detailed in appendix 2.
8 The introduction of a wealth effect with a slow adjustment to the long term desired level comes
from a Creel & Sterdyniak (1995) model. Fair (1997), for example, also takes wealth into account in a
multi-country model. Unlike him however, we do not introduce stocks in households and firms
behaviours.
9 In case of perfect substitutability between domestic and foreign assets, we assume that interests on
wealth are not taxed.
8(3) p p l q r h p p= + + + + - +-1 1log ( ) ( * )y z
(4) w b f= +
(5) b b g y= + + --( )1 1r t
(6) f f bc= + +-( )1 1r
Governments and the ECB
In the EMU, i.e. in the absence of any exchange rate risk, a target for public debt is
needed in order to determine the division of wealth between net foreign assets and public
debt. Without this target, private wealth could be balanced with unstable and symmetric
levels of public debt and external assets10.
In country 1, this target is such that the government is stabilising public debt over
GDP in the long run; this long term steady state level for debt is unknown in the short
run. Government 1 thus controls public spending and debt with no limitations in the short
run. This is not the case in country 2. In this country, the government must stabilise its
debt over GDP at a pre-determined level and must do it in the short run since it has
already reached the ceiling of the Stability Pact. This government must thus follow a
fiscal balance rule in each period.
We analyse the reactions of the two governments and the ECB in these conditions
after a negative private demand shock of 1% of GDP. The shock is either symmetric or
asymmetric. Since countries are heterogeneous in terms of government policies, an
asymmetric shock in country 1 does not give the same results as an asymmetric shock in
country 2.
We consider in this model that the macroeconomic behaviour of private agents is
represented by equations 1 (wealth and disposable income effects) and 3 (wage-price
loop); they do not have any strategic behaviour. This is not the case for policymakers:
they are represented by their reaction functions11. For example, government 1 uses its
expenditures in order to minimise its loss function each quarter:
(7) LG a y a a g y a b y= + + +0 1 2 3² ² ( / )² ( / )²p .
This government is assumed to have targets for output and inflation. Variables in
equations 7 to 10 represent deviations from the initial steady state. Government 1 incurs
losses when it uses its spending.
Government 2 is fettered by the Stability Pact: it is using its tax rate t  to minimis
its loss function but has to pursue meanwhile a strict balanced-budget rule12:
(8) LG a y a a* * ² * ² ' * ²= + +0 1 2p t
                                         
10 In a flexible exchange rate regime or in the EMS, the uncertainty regarding the future value of
external assets denominated in foreign currencies or risk aversion by households are sufficient
conditions for determining the division between domestic and foreign assets.
11 See appendix 4 for more details.
12 See Barrel & Sefton (1997), Capoen & Villa (1997), Jensen & Jensen (1995), van der Ploeg
(1995) for a similar framework. Public expenditures are used to stabilise debt, rather than tax rates,
since it is now well known that fiscal adjustments are more efficient when expenditures are reduced.
9(9) g g y b bg* ( ) * [ * * * ( *)]= - + - + --1 1c c t r m F
The F letter represents the public debt target of government 2; it is exogenous and
has the same form as the public debt norm introduced in the Maastr ch  treaty. The cmg
parameter represents the speed of adjustment of the public deficit to the level required to
reach F. In order for stability conditions of the model to hold, this speed has to be high
(see appendix 1).
The EMU can be characterised by the uniqueness of the nominal short run interest
rate (i) and the independence of the ECB. We will assume that the ECB sets this rate to
implement its monetary policy13. We avoid the difficulties regarding the definition and
level of money supply in the EU and the complications due to the instability of money
demand in financial economies. The ECB minimises its loss function:
(10) LM k
y y
k k M=
+
+
+
+0 1 22 2
(
*
)² (
*
)² ²
p p
r , where r
p p
M i= -
+ *
2
.
The ECB disregards the ratio of public debt over GDP and has henceforth no
specific target regarding it.
Three remarks on monetary and fiscal policies are worth mentioning. First, if the
ECB had controlled a monetary aggregate, the long term inflation rate would have been
unchanged after a shock, following the so-called ‘quantitative theory of money’. Output
would have also been unchanged. If the interest rate is determined through a reaction
function, this time, the long run inflation and real interest rates are not constant, and the
output level can reach a new steady state.
Second, macroeconomic models usually give the priority to inflation in the central
bank’s loss function, according to the credibility argument: the government inflation bias
needs a tough reaction by Central bankers. With no costs for the use of fiscal or
monetary instruments, k1 should therefore be superior to k0 and (k1/k0) should be
superior to (a1/ 0). In our formulation with costs, this latter condition can be rewritten:
(11) )aaa/(ak/)kk( 3201021 -->- , since the cost of using the interest rate
reduces the capacity of the ECB to curb inflation, and the cost of using public
expenditures (or the tax rate) and the cost of increasing public debt reduce the capacity
of governments to stabilise output. We will consider that the weights for output and
public debt are similar in government 1 loss function: condition (11) will then obviously
hold.
Last, the behaviours of monetary and fiscal authorities are such that policies cannot
be considered as exogenous shocks to the economy. In our model, the rationale of
policymakers through the minimisation of loss functions make these policies be
endogenous reactions to private demand shocks.
                                         
13 There is no monetary targeting in the sense that the Central bank sets monetary aggregates to a
certain level or controls that they reach the appropriate level. On this topic, see Sven son (1999).
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Calibrations
Parameter values are presented in table 1. Two considerations intervened in their
choice14: first, their realism which means either that they fit available data (the degree of
openness, for example) or econometric results; second, the necessity that the model be
stable.
Stability conditions are discussed in appendix 1, and the robustness of results to
changing parameters is evaluated in appendix 3. We only concentrate on some important
parameters: those affecting the wealth effect; the speeds of adjustment of wealth to its
desired level and of public spending to the level required to reach a balanced budget; and
the influence of the interest rate on inflation. We check that simulation results are weakly
sensitive to the three latter parameters. As could be expected, the model is more sensitive
to the b parameter: output results can be reversed if the wealth effect is reduced. We
justify the b value we used for our simulations in appendix 2.
Table 1: Parameters and initial steady state values
Parameters a b c d l h m mg q
0,3 2,5 0,85 0,2 8 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,05
Loss functions a0 a1 a2 a3 a’2 k0 k1 k2
0,5 1,5 0,16 0,5 0,16 1,5 3 0,5
Initial values b/y f/y w/y r t F/y
0,25 0 0,25 0,01 0,2 0,25
Demand shocks
The effects of demand shocks and reactions by the different policymakers are
considered next. Above all, we are interested in the variations of the public debt over
GDP ratio in country 1 since we think these have been widely ignored when establishing
a fiscal asymmetry in the provisions of the Stability Pact. The demand shock can be
characterised as an increase in the planned wealth to GDP ratio. It is a negative shock
since consumption is reduced in the short run.
                                         
14 See the advice of C oley (1997) on calibrated models.
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Symmetric shock
After a negative symmetric private demand shock, at Nash equilibrium between the
three policymakers, the nominal interest rate decreases in the Union and government 1
implements an expansionist fiscal policy. Output is kept slightly over its initial steady
state level and deflation is curbed (table 2). In country 2, the tax rate, which is reduced
to comply with the smoothing of fluctuations, sees its effects on output partly cancelled
because public expenditures have also been decreased. Th  output and inflation gaps
between country 1 and country 2 create an external deficit in country 1 (hence, an
external surplus in country 2). The external indebtedness of country 1 will gradually
dampen its output increase.
In the medium run, output in country 2 is lower than in the initial steady state and
the fall in the inflation rate is more pronounced than in country 1. Since government 2 is
fettered by the Stability Pact, government 1 has to implement a more expansionist
policy15; in the long run, public debt increases by 2 points of GDP in country 1. Still, the
improvement in the output in country 1 also crowds in to country 2. The game between
monetary and fiscal authorities prevent key variables (output, inflation rates) from
converging to their initial steady state levels: the real long run interest rate has been
decreased. However, the rise of public debt impinges on monetary policy: it has to be
less expansionist in order to commit governments to more restrictive fiscal policies.
Co-operative policies, in the Nash-bargaining framework16, give the following
results: monetary policy in the medium and long run is more expansionist whereas fiscal
policy in country 1 is less in the medium run in comparison with Nash equilibrium. Loss
functions for the three policymakers are reduced and this equilibrium is Pareto-optimal.
In the long run, the fall in the interest rate reduces public debt over GDP growth; to cope
with the negative shock, government 1 does increase its spending more than in a Nash
equilibrium. Note that policy co-operation, may it be Pareto-optimal, does not mean that
public spending should be lessened.
                                         
15 Government 1 implements a less expansionist policy when it has to bear alone the burden of the
shock (table 3).
16 The co-operative equilibrium is reached after the product of the game earnings for the three
players has been maximised.
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Table 2: Effects of a symmetric private demand shock
Nash equilibrium Co-operation
Ctry 1 Ctry 2 Ctry 1 Ctry 2
2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010
Output (%)
Inflation (points)
Public expenditures
(points of GDP)
Tax rate (points)
Public debt
(points of GDP)
Losses
0.118
-0.502
0.269
0.000
0.535
0.540
0.223
-1.283
0.100
0.000
1.768
4.059
-0.128
-0.631
-0.047
-0.225
0.006
0.614
0.261
-1.261
-0.128
-0.244
0.000
2.427
0.230
-0.372
0.255
0.000
0.435
0.339
0.332
-0.817
0.154
0.000
0.995
1.555
0.048
-0.474
0.033
-0.156
0.001
0.342
0.355
-0.803
-0.027
-0.191
0.000
1.035
2000 2010 2000 2010
ECB’s losses
Real interest rate (points)
1.214
-0.707
5.049
-0.465
0.845
-0.747
2.358
-0.655
N.B.1: results are deviations from initial values.
N.B.2: country 2 is fettered by the Stability Pact.
Asymmetric shocks
After an asymmetric negative private demand shock, the economic situation in each
country not only depends on the fact that it has been hit by the shock, but also on its
ability to react to it.
If the shock occurs in country 1 (table 3), the relatively large use of public
expenditures by government 1 at Nash equilibrium is such that the ECB is encouraged to
implement a very weak expansionist policy; output falls in country 1 and its public debt
soars. Country 2 is isolated from the effects of the shock in the short run since monetary
policy is not tough. In the medium run, the accumulation of an external surplus in
country 1 (the income and price effects on the trade balance go in the same direction)
increases its external wealth and is favourable to output growth in this country. In the
long run, effects of fiscal and monetary policies cancel each other: with the small
reduction of the interest rate, government 1 just slightly increases its spending; there is
therefore a large fall in prices which spreads over country 2.
At co-operative equilibrium, monetary and fiscal policies are more expansionist in
the short run to keep outputs nearest to their steady state levels; this provokes a larger
increase of the public debt over GDP ratio than at Nash equilibrium. In the medium run,
this substantial debt leads the ECB to keep its interest rate at a higher level than at Nash
equilibrium; as a consequence, public spending in country 1 is dampened. Output levels
in both countries are kept near to their initial levels and the fall in prices is slowed down.
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Table 3: Effects of an asymmetric private demand shock in country 1
Nash equilibrium Co-operation
Ctry 1 Ctry 2 Ctry 1 Ctry 2
2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010
Output (%)
Inflation (points)
Public expenditures
(points of GDP)
Tax rate (points)
Public debt
(points of GDP)
Losses
(Losses*)
-0.149
-0.214
0.095
0.000
0.773
0.380
(0.42)
0.139
-0.651
0.055
0.000
0.825
0.987
(0.50)
0.088
-0.093
0.064
0.009
-0.003
0.017
(0.02)
0.115
-0.667
-0.076
-0.138
0.000
0.677
(0.63)
-0.086
-0.169
0.104
0.000
0.757
0.334
(0.35)
0.113
-0.339
0.040
0.000
1.060
0.741
(0.25)
0.130
-0.049
-0.065
-0.121
0.006
0.014
(0.03)
0.098
-0.349
-0.235
-0.285
0.000
0.200
(0.31)
2000 2010 2000 2010
ECB’s losses
(ECB’s losses*)
Real interest rate (points)
(Real interest rate*)
0.094
(0.10)
-0.212
(-0.17)
1.358
(0.61)
-0.248
(-0.09)
0.060
(0.03)
-0.217
(-0.13)
0.392
(0.10)
-0.201
(-0.11)
N.B.1: results are deviations from initial values.
N.B.2: country 2 is fettered by the Stability Pact.
*: simulations with the same model, except that both countries can implement fiscal policies with no
constraint in the short-medium run17.
If the shock occurs in country 2 (table 4), the large price decrease in this country is
such that the ECB has to reduce its interest rate more toughly than in the preceding case
since government 2 is unable to react to the shock. Government 1 increases its spending
to compensate the deflationary shock; this can be implemented more easily than in the
preceding case because public debt has dropped with interest charges. In the medium and
long run, the decrease in country 2 output will be dampened by the growth of external
wealth.
In the medium run, the economic situation in country 1, as described by government
losses, is more favourable in this case than in the preceding one. Government 1 is
however more involved in this shock than government 2 was when the shock occurred in
country 1: government 1 losses in the present case are superior to government 2’s in the
preceding. In the long run, government 1 losses are superior to its own losses after
country 1 had faced the shock. This can be explained by the fact that the sharp fall in the
real interest rate after the shock has hit country 2 has given government 1 the
opportunity to implement a more and more expansionist policy in order to curb deflation.
In fine, public debt has soared because the ECB has decided to reduce the drop in the
                                         
17 Both governments have a loss function of the form given in equation (7). Only government 1 and
the ECB situations in our two variants can be compared since their loss functions are similar from one
variant to the other.
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interest rate after public expenditures have been kept on increasing. Co-operative
equilibrium does not reverse the feedback effect: the country which manages its fiscal
policy without restraint suffers from the fiscal policy burden on its partner.
Table 4: Effects of an asymmetric private demand shock in country 2
Nash equilibrium Co-operation
Ctry 1 Ctry 2 Ctry 1 Ctry 2
2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010
Output (%)
Inflation (points)
Public expenditures
(points of GDP)
Tax rate (points)
Public debt
(points of GDP)
Losses
(Losses*)
0.267
-0.289
0.175
0.000
-0.238
0.194
(0.02)
0.084
-0.632
0.045
0.000
0.942
1.047
(0.63)
-0.215
-0.538
-0.111
-0.235
0.009
0.467
(0.42)
0.146
-0.594
-0.051
-0.106
0.000
0.541
(0.50)
0.336
-0.152
0.169
0.000
-0.050
0.097
(0.03)
0.143
-0.408
0.075
0.000
0.518
0.396
(0.31)
-0.187
-0.439
-0.061
-0.168
0.006
0.311
(0.35)
0.195
-0.376
-0.005
-0.086
0.000
0.232
(0.25)
2000 2010 2000 2010
ECB’s losses
(ECB’s losses*)
Real interest rate (points)
(Real interest rate*)
0.637
(0.10)
-0.495
(-0.17)
1.170
(0.61)
-0.217
(-0.09)
0.363
(0.03)
-0.431
(-0.13)
0.556
(0.10)
-0.322
(-0.11)
N.B.1: results are deviations from initial values.
N.B.2: country 2 is fettered by the Stability Pact.
*: simulations with the same model, except that both countries can implement fiscal policies with no
restraint in the short-medium run
As a conclusion, co-operation is always favourable for the three policymakers and it
does not automatically lead to a reduction in public deficits and debts (see the case of a
symmetric or asymmetric shock in country 1). We can also check that the Stability Pact
places a heavy weight on government 1 and the ECB. In tables 3 and 4, results for the
simulations of asymmetric shocks are presented in the same model as that used before
except that the two countries control their fiscal instruments (they can implement
whatever fiscal policy they want); hence, both countries are in the situation of country 1
in the previous model.
Country 1, whose government can implement fiscal policies in the two models, is
largely burdened when government 2 is fettered by the Pact. If the shock occurs in
country 2, the loss of government 1 is divided by ten if government 2 is free to choose its
policy, in comparison with the situation with the Pact. Government 2 would also prefer
to use its spending without restraint: macroeconomic stabilisation would not depend to a
large extent on a “medium” monetary policy and the slow spillover effects of foreign
policies. As for the ECB, its policy is always less expansionist when it does not have to
substitute for a government as far as stabilisation policies in the EU are concerned. Its
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losses are reduced. This result is not the consequence of the reduced costs for the use of
the monetary instrument (see equation 10). If we do not take these costs into account,
ECB’s losses when both governments implement policies (countries are symmetric) will
always be equal or inferior to losses when one of them falls under the rules of the Pact
(countries are asymmetric) (table 5).
Table 5: ECB’s losses at Nash equilibrium*
Shock on country 1 Shock on country 2
Asymmetric
countries
Symmetric
countries
Asymmetric
countries
Symmetric
countries
2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010
ECB’s losses 0.07 1.33 0.08 0.61 0.51 1.15 0.08 0.61
*: losses are computed with 0k2 = in equation 10.
Conclusion
Since the Amsterdam treaty in 1997, the compelling respect of the public deficit
criterion has been dictated to countries willing to enter the Euroland. The so-called norm
of 3% of GDP has been confirmed by the Stability Pact and will force countries either to
implement pro-cyclical fiscal policies if this limit has already been reached or exceeded,
or to have a very weak structural deficit in order to gain rooms for manoeuvre.
In this paper, we have dealt with the feedback effects of the Stability Pact on the
ECB and the country which is not directly subject to the provisions of the Pact. The
three policymakers in the model see their stabilisation capacities reduced by the existence
of the Pact. With our dynamic and patrimonial model, we have been able to distinguish
between the short-run and long-run effects of economic policies. Hence, we have shed
light on the constraints falling on indebted countries. Debt implications are substantial:
they change the temporal feature of monetary policy which, by way of consequence,
modify fiscal policies. Note also that in this model, countries do not have to follow fiscal
balance rules. The change in fiscal policy in the long run, in order to limit debt growth in
percentage of GDP, is a sufficient condition to reach a new steady state.
We show that a stringent application of the provisions of the Stability Pact will
substantially fetter the framework for economic policies in the whole EU. More
noteworthy, the Stability Pact impinges negatively on fiscally ‘virtuous’ policymakers, as
well as on the ECB. A softer respect of the fiscal norm would be more appropriate: the
3% of GDP would be considered as a nominal anchor; countries would be free to
stabilise their economies after a downturn and they would have to take benefit of
economic expansions to recover rooms for manoeuvre for future crises18. One condition
                                         
18 Buiter et al. (1993) have proposed that the 3% norm be applied to the structural public deficit, n
order to satisfy to the so-called go den rule for public finances. Eichengreen (1997) insists however on
16
should also be met: governments in the Euroland would rather co-operate with each
others and co-operate with the ECB.
                                                                                                          
the risks with the norm promoted by Buiter et al. (no credibility, possible drift…). He prefers that the
structural public deficit be zero.
17
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Appendix 1: Stability conditions
To make understanding easier, we present the model dynamics in the closed
economy and assume that there is just one asset: public assets. We consider two cases in
the model.
First, the government is able to implement any policy, whether expansionist or
restrictive, in the short or in the long run: the government controls its instruments. The
model dynamics if we do not make fiscal policies explicit is of the following form:
(A1) p l q r
·
= + + +log ( )y z1 ;
(A2) w w g y
·
= + -r t .
Under a matrix form, we get:
(A3) p
r
p p·
·
é
ë
ê
ê
ù
û
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ú
=
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ê
ù
û
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-
-
é
ë
ê
ù
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w w w
X
0 0
0
*
*
The model is intrinsically unstable if a fiscal or monetary policy is not implemented.
The economy has to be stabilised by a government, which sets public expenditures,
and/or a Central banker, which sets the nominal interest rate. These two policies impinge
on long term inflation and the wealth dynamics. Hence, fiscal and monetary policies have
symmetric influences on inflation. Our model differs obviously and voluntarily from a
monetarist model and give henceforth the priority to a realist19 and patr monial view of
monetary policy.
In the second case, the government follows a fiscal-balance rule. The model
dynamics if we do not make monetary policy explicit becomes:
(A1) p l q r
·
= + + +log ( )y z1 ;
(A2) w w g y
·
= + -r t ;
(A4) g g w yg g
·
= - - + + +c c r m ct cm( ) F .
Under a matrix form, we get:
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, or V AU Y= + .
The determinant of matrix A is always positive since cmg > 0. The trace of matrix A
is negative if and only if: r c< . The stability of the model, without any macroeconomic
stabilisation policies, thus necessitates that public expenditures be highly sensitive to
public deficit variations. The introduction of a policy, even a fiscal-balance one, is a
                                         
19 See Svensson (1999).
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sufficient stability condition for this model. It is nonetheless crucial that this fiscal rule be
stringent. After any increase in public debt or decrease in taxes, the government has to
reduce its spending to make debt converge to its stable arbitrarily chosen level, F .
Appendix 2: Wealth effect
Our specification for private consumption can be compared with the one used in the
Multimod model of the IMF (see Masson et al., 1990). In this model, real private wealth
W is the sum of human wealth, capital, money, public debt and net financial assets.
Recall that in our model, wealth is the sum of public debt and net foreign assets only.
The consumption function in the short run in Multimod is written:
(A6) 80DUMCDEMC]y)1log[(CC)
C
W
log(CCClog 5432
1
1
10 ++t-D+r++=D
-
-
where C is private consumption, DEM the dependency ratio which takes into account the
link between young and old generations, DUM80 a dummy variable for 1980, and D the
first difference operator. Equation (A6) has been tested and results are :
.02.0C;19.0C;35.0C;59.0C;09.0C;4.0C 543210 ===-==-=
Consumption growth increases with wealth and disposable income’s growth but
decreases with the real interest rate.
In the long run, consumption takes the following form:
(A7) DEM22.6Wlog
09.0
C
Clog 0 +r-+= .
These results do not explain much on the reasons why households want to
accumulate wealth for their consumption. Moreover, is long term consumption
increasing or decreasing with the interest rate? This question is unanswerable so long as
wealth accumulation is not taken into account in equation (A7). This is the reason why
we introduced the real wealth effect and supposed planned or desired wealth 
~
W woul
be growing with the real interest rate and disposable income. Further, we considered that
the propensity to save (or increase wealth) from disposable income would be growing
with the real interest rate, so that we gave the priority to the following formulation:
(A8) y)1)((W
~
t-br+a= .
For a zero real interest rate, the wealth over disposable income ratio is supposed to
be positive ( %30=a ). At the initial steady state, we assumed debt over GDP was equal
to 25% and net foreign assets were zero. With an initial real interest rate equal to 1%, b
equals 2.5. With these parameter values, our consumption formulation does not differ
much from that in Masson et al., except in the long run.
In the short run, consumption in our model follows:
(A9) )WW(Wy)1(C
~
-m+r+t-= .
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Wealth has two effects on consumption: households consume interests and there
exists a real wealth effect.
Using equations (A8) and (A9) in first difference, we obtain:
(A10) rDt-mb-+Dm+r+Dt-br+am-=D ]y)1(W[W)(y)1)]((1[C 000000 ;
where variables with subscript 0 are initial values (see table 1).
With the chosen values, private consumption in the short run is such that:
(A11) rD-r+Dt-=D - 35.0W31.0y)1(9.0C 10 .
This formulation differs slightly from Masson et al.’s since in our model, variations
and not only the level of the real interest rate impinge on consumption growth. In the
long run, differences are more substantial since wealth can be replaced by its value in
equation (A8). We thus get:
(A12) rD+Dt-=D 27.0y)1(C 0 .
Consumption growth hence depends positively on the real interest rate growth.
Inflation hence reduces private consumption in the long run whereas a restrictive
monetary policy increases it. Therefore, the government has to implement a fiscal
contraction to reduce aggregate demand.
Appendix 3: Model robustness to some parameters
In simulated models, and more importantly in dynamic models, results can depend
on parameter values. We present in this section the time path of the output level at Nash
equilibrium in the country which faces the demand shock, using three different values for
each parameter we study. These values meet the stability conditions of the model.
In our model, four parameters deserve peculiar attention; the two firsts are related to
the private wealth effect: the sensitivity to the interest rate, b, and th  speed of
adjustment to the desired wealth level, m. Next because of the introduction of a fiscal
balance rule, the sensitivity of public spending to public deficit variations, c, becomes a
crucial parameter. Last, inflation dynamics depends on the effect of the interest rate
whose sensitivity on prices is measured by (1+q).
The b parameter
A low level for the sensitivity of private wealth to the interest rate means that this
wealth effect is weakened: if the negative demand shock has led to a public debt increase,
the interest rate has to rise substantially (or be lessened to a smaller extent) to maintain
the long run patrimonial balance. The output impact is therefore more restrictive than
with larger values of b (see figures A1 to A3). More precisely, with a weak wealth
effect, fiscal policy is very active in the short run (in comparison with a situation with a
higher b) because public debt has no substantial effect on aggregate demand. In the
medium and long run, however, this higher debt modifies monetary and fiscal policies:
monetary policy, which was expansionist, and fiscal policy become very tight. The ECB
moves first; afterwards, the long-lasting effect on debt of the rise in the interest rate
22
compels the government to reduce spending; the falls in output and prices are very tough
in the long run.
Figure A1: Output sensitivity in country 1 to beta, symmetric shock
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Figure A2: Output sensitivity in country 1 to beta, asymmetric shock in country 1
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Figure A3: Output sensitivity in country 2 to beta, asymmetric shock in country 2
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The c parameter
This parameter is of crucial importance as far as the model stability is concerned. It
has no implication on the values of steady state variables. As figures A4 to A6 show,
small values for this parameter slow down the time path to the new steady state.
Figure A4: Output sensitivity in country 1 to c, symmetric shock
-0,10
-0,05
0,00
0,05
0,10
0,15
0,20
0,25
0,30
0,35
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
khi=0,4
khi=0,7
khi=0,85
24
Figure A5: Output sensitivity in country 1 to c, asymmetric shock in country 1
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Figure A6: Output sensitivity in country 2 to c, asymmetric shock in country 2
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The m parameter
The higher the speed of adjustment of actual to planned wealth, the speeder
economies reach their new steady states. In the short run, a higher speed of adjustment
has more substantial stabilisation effects: the gap between actual and planned wealth has
more impact on aggregate demand if  is large. Output deviations from the initial steady
state are smaller. The forms of the time path between initial and final steady states are
not radically changed if values of this parameter are modified (see figures A7 to A9).
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Figure A7: Output sensitivity in country 1 to m, symmetric shock
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Figure A8: Output sensitivity in country 1 to m, asymmetric shock in country 1
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Figure A9: Output sensitivity in country 2 to m, asymmetric shock in country 2
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The q parameter
The different values for parameter q do not have any influence on the output steady
state path. The model is therefore not sensitive to this parameter (see figures A10 to
A12).
Figure A10: Output sensitivity in country 1 to q, symmetric shock
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Figure A11: Output sensitivity in country 1 to q, asymmetric shock in country 1
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Figure A12: Output sensitivity in country 2 to q, asymmetric shock in country 2
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Appendix 4: Nash and Nash-bargaining equilibria
Assume LNG et LNM are respectively a government and a central bank loss function at
Nash equilibrium:
L y
L y
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NM M M M
= + +
= + +
a b p g t
a b p g r
² ² ²
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At Nash equilibrium, one gets:
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To determine a co-operative equilibrium, one usually distinguishes between two
methods: first, the Nash-bargaining equilibrium which consists in the maximisation of the
product of earnings due to co-operation, i.e. the product of the differences between
losses at Nash equilibrium and at the co-operative equilibrium for each player; the
resulting bargaining equilibrium is henceforth Pareto-optimal. We have, with LCG et LCM
the government and central bank loss functions at the co-operative equilibrium
respectively:
Max L L L LNG CG NM CMt r, ( )( )- - , hence:
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Since both policymakers have already reached Nash equilibrium which means, by
definition, that each authority has assumed that the policy of the other authority is
constant, we also have:
¶
¶t
¶
¶t
¶
¶r
¶
¶r
L L L LNG NM NG NM= = = =0 0 0 0; ; ; .
It comes that:
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The second method follows a negotiation framework. Co-operative equilibrium is
reached after a weighted average of both policymakers’ loss functions has been
minimised. With the negotiation parameter l, where0 1< <l , the computations follow:
{ }Min L LCG CMt r l l, ( )+ -1 , hence:
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The negotiation framework will be Pareto-optimal if the following condition is met:
( ) :E
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.
Thus, the Nash-bargaining equilibrium can be described as the search for the value
of l which maximises the product of earnings due to the co-operation. It is therefore
impossible that the negotiation comes up to a counter-productive (or sub-optimal)
equilibrium. Moreover, the condition (E3) ensures that if one player is in a more
favourable situation than at the Nash equilibrium, it is also the case for the second player
since l l/ ( )1 0- > : equilibrium is Pareto-optimal.
Values for the economic instruments at the co-operative equilibrium are resulting
from equations (E1’) and (E2’):
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After a small variation in one of the two instruments, the government loss function
varies in the sense:
dL L dtG G= ( / )¶ ¶t . If we take equation (E1’) into account and assume that loss
functions are of a quadratic form:
dL L dt dLG M M= - - = - -[( ) / ]( / ) [( ) / ]1 1l l ¶ ¶t l l .
After any deviation of one instrument from its value at the co-operative equilibrium,
loss functions of the two policymakers vary in opposite directions: the co-operative
equilibrium is then Pareto-optimal.
